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RUSSIA AND THE CIS IN 2008
Axis of Authoritarianism?

Charles E. Ziegler

Abstract
Russia’s seamless presidential succession produced no major changes in domestic politics or foreign policy. Ties with Asia remained strong, though several key relationships—with China, Japan, and the Central Asian states—frayed
under the impact of Russia’s military action in Georgia. Impressive economic
performance in the first half of the year boosted Russian confidence as a great
power, but its vulnerability to the global financial crisis together with the heavyhanded operation in the Caucasus undermined Moscow’s standing with both
Asia and Europe by the end of the year.
Keywords: Russia, foreign policy, economic crisis, great power, Asia, energy

Tectonic economic and political shifts in 2008 led some
observers to suggest that the fulcrum of power was shifting away from the
Western liberal democratic world toward a new nationalistic, authoritarian group of states led by Russia and China.1 Although the Sino-Russian
partnership showed occasional strains, Washington’s neglect of Asia in an
election year facilitated Moscow’s more active diplomacy in the AsiaPacific. Politically, Russia managed a smooth transition, with Dmitry Medvedev succeeding Vladimir Putin as president, although the latter remained
on the scene as a powerful prime minister who frequently overshadowed
his young protégé. Confidence in Russia’s great power status was shaken in
Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and University Scholar, Department
of Political Science, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, U.S.A. Email: <ceziegler@
louisville.edu>.
1. This argument was voiced by Robert Kagan in The Return of History and the End of
Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008).
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the fall of 2008 by the global financial crisis, which highlighted the country’s dependence on world markets, particularly in the field of energy. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia further eroded Moscow’s standing in
the West. China, Japan, and Central Asia were troubled by Russia’s violation of Georgian sovereignty, but economic considerations muted criticism.
A severe dip in oil prices toward the end of the year eroded the foundation
of Russia’s success story, but the prospect of new energy deals in Asia was
cause for some optimism.

Meet the New Boss
Russians were treated to the spectacle of a stage-managed, thoroughly predictable presidential election in the early months of 2008. President Putin
had designated First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev as his successor in
December, and Medvedev promised to continue Putin’s program. The propresidential United Russia Party, which had garnered nearly 65% of the
vote and 315 of 450 seats in the December 2007 Duma elections, threw its
considerable political weight behind the young technocrat. Medvedev also
solidified his position by indicating his intention to appoint Putin as prime
minister immediately upon taking office.
The opposition, such as it was, never really had a chance. Four candidates were registered for the March elections. Gennady Zyuganov once
again represented the Communist Party; nationalist and peripatetic political clown Vladimir Zhirinovsky was nominated by his Liberal Democratic
Party. The final candidate was an unknown former member of United
Russia, Andrey Bogdanov, who was reportedly backed by the Kremlin in
a bid to split the opposition. The Central Electoral Commission rejected
former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s attempt to secure a place on
the ballot, declaring that his nomination petition contained invalid signatures. Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov also failed to secure
a spot, and Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the ailing Union of Right Forces
Party, withdrew from the contest in late December.
As expected, the state-dominated mass media provided Medvedev with
favorable coverage, while the Kremlin-sponsored group Nashi (Ours) rallied the youth vote, ensuring a landslide victory for Putin’s choice, with
just over 70% of the vote. The Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe declined to monitor the elections in the face of government obstruction; observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe who did attend said the vote appeared to reflect the will of Russian
voters, but they questioned the overall fairness of the electoral process.
Inherent in Russia’s mixed presidential-parliamentary system, patterned
after the French model, is an uncertain division of authority between the
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two executive positions. Medvedev asserted that he would be responsible
for foreign policy (the Constitution assigns this power to the presidency),
while Putin’s brief seemed to include the economy and domestic affairs.
However, Putin’s subsequent behavior during the Georgia crisis made it
clear he still carried significant, probably decisive, authority on foreign and
security questions. A system of dual power (dvoevlastie) between Medvedev
and Putin may well be untenable. Historically, divided authority in Russia
has been a sign of weakness, as it was in 1917 (when the Petrograd Soviet
and Provisional Government vied for control) and in 1993, when Boris Yeltsin used tanks to quell an insurrection by Parliament. Putin and Medvedev
did not clash openly during the first year, but the institutional framework
makes a future contest for power difficult to avoid.
Nonetheless, potential conflicts between the two were not evident during the Georgia crisis, in which Russian forces rushed to the aid of the
South Ossetians following President Mikheil Saakashvili’s ill-considered
decision to try to restore Tbilisi’s control over the breakaway region. Putin
seemed to be calling the shots, with Medvedev readily acquiescing to his
constitutional subordinate’s actions. Putin, who was in Beijing for the
Olympics when Georgian forces started shelling Tskhinvali, the capital of
separatist South Ossetia, flew to Vladikavkaz (the capital of North Ossetia) to direct military operations. Medvedev played his role by condemning
Georgian aggression and accusing Saakashvili’s government of “genocide.”
The Russian Duma, piqued by U.S. and European support for an independent Kosovo, unanimously urged Medvedev to grant diplomatic recognition to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which he did on August 26.
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy priorities appear unlikely to change
under Medvedev—the goals of preserving great power status and exercising maximum political influence along the unstable southern and eastern
borders are immensely popular with ordinary Russians and are a vital component of official Moscow’s national security program. Restoring military
power is a priority over the next few years—Russia plans to spend $50 billion on its military in 2008 and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin announced
in September that defense spending would increase by an additional 26%
in 2009.
Tensions with the West may redirect Russian attention eastward, but the
interests of major bureaucratic actors and powerful business interests (especially those in the commodities trade) are not directly affected by diplomatic disputes. However, of the different foreign policy factions in Russia,
the Westernizers (those favoring close ties with the U.S. and Europe and
supporting neoliberal economic policies) are currently the least influential.
The siloviki (top officials in the armed forces, secret police, and power ministries) and Russian nationalists are in a much stronger position, which
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suggests that relations with the U.S. and Europe will remain testy. Asia has
been far more supportive of Russia politically and has economic potential
equal to that of Europe’s, but Russia’s geographic position and the demographic imbalance between European Russia and the Far East constrain
Moscow’s options in Asia.

The Best of Times?
By the time Putin left the presidency he had managed to reassert state control over the commanding heights of the economy, using a neomercantilist
strategy similar to that pursued by China to privilege “national champions,”
marking out an economic policy distinct from the neoliberal stance of
Washington or London.2 From the Kremlin’s perspective, a state guided
economy was demonstrably more stable than the Western model, which in
the first half of the year was plagued by the real estate crisis originating
in the U.S. Russia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth had been a
very respectable 8.1% in 2007, and although 2008 was expected to be somewhat lower, it was shaping up to be a very good year. Foreign exchange reserves stood at over $500 billion in mid-2008, oil prices reached an all-time
high in June, and the country realized a $260 billion trade surplus in the
first half of the year.
By late 2008, the Russian economy was in free fall. At one point in October, Russia’s two major stock exchanges had fallen 75% from their May
level, and the government drew down its reserves when it allocated over
$210 billion to bail out banks and major corporations.3 Inflation was a
problem, driven by high oil prices and capital inflows, with food prices rising rapidly at an overall rate of around 15% for the first half of the year.
In the latter half, Russia was severely impacted by the global financial crisis and the precipitous drop in oil prices, from a high of $147 per barrel in
June to under $50 a barrel for Urals crude in December. Capital flight accelerated after Putin accused the giant coal and steel firm Mechel of underpaying its taxes; net outflows reached $33 billion in August-September, and
the situation worsened after the Georgian conflict.4 Few Russians seemed

2. The idea of national champions was discussed in Putin’s 1997 dissertation on strategic
resources. From this perspective, the most important sectors of the economy—oil and natural
gas, other minerals, armaments, nuclear power—should be fully or partially state-owned, or
at least under state influence. The most prominent national champions include Gazprom (the
state-owned gas monopoly), Rosneft (oil), Alrosa (diamonds), Rosoboroneksport (defense),
and Rosnanotech (State Nanotechnology Corporation).
3. Washington Post, October 24, 2008.
4. RIA (Russian News and Information Agency), Novosti, October 17, 2008.
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worried about the crisis, though, because the state-controlled media downplayed the severity of the economic downturn and focused the blame on
the U.S.
On the positive side, Russian firms concluded a number of deals that
strengthened the country’s economic position in Central Asia. In March,
state energy giant Gazprom acquiesced to Central Asian demands for a
better return on their natural gas, agreeing to bring payments up to world
price levels by 2009. Under the direction of Anatoly Chubais, the state
monopoly Unified Energy Systems finished privatizing most of its subsidiaries, with foreign utilities assuming significant shares in the new companies. Moscow also moved to consolidate its hold over vital sectors of
the economy—a new law enacted in 2008 regulated foreign investment in
42 strategic sectors, including oil and gas, nuclear power, defense related
industries, and mining. American-backed plans to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India foundered on an upsurge of violence in Afghanistan and uncertainty in the
wake of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s August resignation.
Russia’s energy pipelines eastward became more important in Moscow’s
calculations as Europeans made energy diversification a priority. Work continued on the East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline; the first section (Taishet—Skovorodino) was scheduled to be completed by the end of
2009. Although hugely expensive (at $14 billion), the ESPO would provide
Russia with alternate export routes, enhancing leverage vis-à-vis the Europeans. Putin traveled to the Russian Far East to promote the pipeline in
the wake of European criticism over the Georgian conflict, and the Russian government announced plans to increase the share of its oil exports
to the Asian-Pacific region from the current 3% to 30%, with gas exports to
grow to 15%. State pipeline monopoly Transneft had reportedly drawn up
blueprints for the oil pipeline spur to Daqing, China, by late October. It is
still unclear, though, whether the Siberian fields contain sufficient oil to
justify both the Pacific and the Daqing routes.
Russia and China continued negotiating on a natural gas pipeline, but
the two sides differed over a pricing formula. Gazprom is trying to realize the
same price for gas exports to Asia as it has in Europe (by tying the price to
a basket of crude oil prices), but the Chinese have resisted. With the Europeans now searching for alternatives to Russian oil and gas, the Asian markets have become more attractive. Piped gas from Russia is the most logical
option for meeting China’s growing demand, but pipelines tie nations into
webs of interdependence and in any case the Chinese have resisted paying European prices. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is an option, but an expensive one—Chinese demand has already driven up international prices
for this commodity. China also wants oil and gas pipelines routed directly
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to its territory, rather than through Mongolia or via the Russian Pacific
coast.5
For China, as for Europe, Central Asian oil and gas are attractive options, given Moscow’s active political use of the energy lever. In addition,
Central Asians may prove more interested in shipping their oil and gas eastward following Russia’s military action in the Caucasus, which threatens
existing and planned pipelines to Europe. Those Central Asian societies
with substantial numbers of Russian expatriates—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and Kyrgyzstan—are now understandably nervous about Moscow’s more
muscular approach to dealing with its neighbors. While China’s looming
presence and the inflow of Chinese goods and nationals cause unease
among Central Asians, Beijing to this point has demonstrated no inclination to use force in the region.
Russia’s trade with East Asian economies continued to grow in 2008,
while its share of Central Asian trade lost ground to China. RussianChinese trade reached a record $48.1 billion in 2007, an increase of about
44% over the previous year. About $6.7 billion of this consisted of Russian oil exports, which were down slightly over the previous year. The real
growth was in Chinese exports to Russia, which surged by 80% over the
previous year. Arms sales to China declined as Beijing increasingly utilized its own technology to modernize the People’s Liberation Army. Russian military equipment also came in for some bad press because of its
poor performance in the Georgian campaign, making it less attractive to
Asian buyers.
Russo-Japanese trade more than doubled between 2006 and 2007, growing from $9.6 billion to $20 billion.6 Energy accounted for much of this—
the Sakhalin II project ramped up its exports of crude to Japan in 2008,
and deliveries of LNG are expected to begin in 2009. Economic cooperation between Russia and South Korea continued apace. Bilateral trade was
up sharply, at $15 billion in 2007, and a number of projects were discussed
during President Lee Myung-bak’s September visit to Moscow. Lee proposed a “New Silk Road” of Russian-Korean cooperation in energy, railways, and agriculture. The most prominent project was a huge natural gas
deal envisioning delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually over a
30-year period, starting in 2015, supplying about 20% of South Korean
demand. The pipeline is to run through North Korea, assuming Pyongyang eventually agrees to cooperate, or the gas could be delivered in liquefied form if a pipeline proves unfeasible.
5. John Helmer, “China Stumbles in Forging Russia Gas Deals,” Asia Times online, January 11, 2008, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JF11Ag01.html>.
6. Anna Smolchenko, “Fukuda to Build Ties before G8,” Moscow Times, April 25, 2008.
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The Korean gas agreement, worth an estimated $90 billion–$100 billion,
is one indication of Gazprom’s plan to diversify exports away from Europe.
Since the Siberian fields (the Kovykta field north of Irkutsk and Vilyusky
in the Sakha Republic) are far from the Pacific and will require expensive
pipelines, Gazprom would prefer to supply gas from Sakhalin. But the
company does not own ready Sakhalin 1 gas, and Sakhalin 2 gas (in which
it does have a 50% stake) is virtually all promised in long-term contracts to
Japanese, Korean, and American buyers.
Russia’s Far East continued to languish, victim of Moscow’s usual
promises for massive investments, which have never been realized in full.
In September, Medvedev made a tour of the Far East region, attending development conferences in Chukotka and Kamchatka, where he criticized
local leaders for their failure to deal with problems of declining population, unemployment, and poverty. Medvedev also stopped off in Magadan
to discuss the gold mining industry, where he clashed with executives demanding tax breaks. Stricter visa restrictions did little to moderate regional
paranoia about Chinese migration, as tensions flared occasionally between
Russian residents and Chinese students and migrant laborers.

Eurasian Leanings
In its new Foreign Policy Concept of July 2008, Russia for the first time
defined itself as a Eurasian rather than European power, according to Igor
Morgulov, Russian minister counselor to China.7 In May, Medvedev confirmed the Eurasian direction of the country’s foreign policy by making
his first official visit abroad to Kazakhstan—a brief stopover, followed by
his primary destination, China. Medvedev’s choice reflected the fact that
ties with Europe and the U.S. were strained, while those with Asia were
relatively good. Kazakhstan is the least problematic of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) countries for Moscow, and China is easily the
most important Asian nation.
Tensions with the Bush administration, and critical comments directed
against Russia by the American presidential candidates, particularly John
McCain, strengthened Moscow’s resolve to signal its preference for Asian
partners. During Medvedev’s trip to Beijing, he and President Hu Jintao
voiced their opposition to American plans for a strategic missile defense
shield in Europe, asserting that it would threaten the world’s strategic balance.8 The two sides also agreed on the need for a multilateral world order
in which human rights issues were not used as a screen for interfering in
7. Chinadaily.com, July 30, 2008, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>. The concept can be
found at <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>.
8. Financial Times, May 24, 2008.
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countries’ sovereign internal affairs. Russia provided assistance to China following the May earthquake, bringing 1,000 traumatized students to Russia for convalescence. China expressed strong support for Russia hosting
the 2014 Olympics in the Black Sea city of Sochi, even in the wake of criticism over Georgia. Shortly after Medvedev returned to Moscow, Russia
and China celebrated the signing of a final border demarcation along their
4,300-kilometer frontier in July, capping 40 years of negotiations and finalizing an agreement reached in 2004.
Although Medvedev described China as one of Russia’s foremost partners in foreign policy, China has differed with Russia in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). China would prefer to see the organization’s economic role move to the forefront, where China is stronger than
Russia. Moscow is understandably less enthusiastic. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia also put Beijing in a difficult position. The Chinese
value their partnership with Russia as a counterweight to the U.S., but Beijing’s commitment to the principle of inviolable sovereignty and territorial
integrity, given the possibility of separatism in the People’s Republic, made
it unlikely that China would support Russian-sponsored independence for
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
At the annual SCO meeting in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, China
and the Central Asian states urged Russia and Georgia to resolve their differences peacefully through dialogue, while preserving the unity and territorial integrity of states in accord with international law. Beijing’s policy
has sought to maintain good relations with both Moscow and Washington, so Chinese officials were reluctant to take sides in the conflict. China
was preoccupied with fluidity along its periphery—leadership turnover in
Pakistan, rioting in Thailand, and the selection of Taro Aso, a hawkish supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, as Japan’s prime minister.9 Officials in
Beijing were also miffed that the conflict in the Caucasus deflected attention from their all-out effort to showcase the 2008 Olympics.
Russia’s resort to military force in the Caucasus produced widely varying
reactions among the country’s putative allies in the CIS. Georgia announced
its withdrawal from the enfeebled organization. Ukraine’s leadership split,
with President Viktor Yushenko taking a hard line against Moscow and
lobbying for NATO membership, while Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko
avoided criticizing Russia. Kazakhstan, which had invested heavily in Georgia, refused to support Russia through the SCO and in late August launched
a “Road to Europe” plan in connection with Kazakhstan’s 2010 chairmanship of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
9. Yu Bin, “China Still On-side with Russia,” Asia Times online, September 6, 2008, <http://
www.atimes.com>.

RUSSIA AND THE CIS IN 2008

143

(OECD).10 Azerbaijan recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity and welcomed Georgian refugees, but the vulnerability of the country’s oil and
gas export routes, illustrated by British Petroleum’s decision to shut down
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline temporarily, may force Baku to work more
closely with Moscow. The energy producing states of Central Asia, by contrast, may find greater security in shipping their product eastward to China.
Japan and Russia continued to discuss the perennial issue of the disputed Northern Territories (Kurile Islands), though Medvedev showed no
sign of being more accommodative on the issue than was Putin. During
Prime Minster Fukuda Yasuo’s April visit to Moscow, a joint venture was
announced between the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metal National Corporation
(JOGMEC) and Irkutsk Oil to explore for oil in East Siberia.11 Japan offered its support in developing the Russian Far East, though Tokyo was
unhappy with Moscow’s plans to invest in the Northern Territories, thus
making it more attractive for the Russian inhabitants to stay.
The Japanese sided with the other G-8 countries in condemning Russia’s
military action in Georgia, including Moscow’s diplomatic recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.12 Tokyo immediately pledged up to $1 million
in emergency humanitarian assistance to Georgia and postponed planned
naval exercises with Russia. Japan’s Ministry of Defense warned in its 2008
White Paper that Russia had reemerged as a strong state and was developing a military posture in the Far East commensurate with its new economic
potential.13 For Japan, a confident Russia that is more confrontational toward the U.S. underlines the importance of the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance,
and may have encouraged the recent warming in Japan’s ties with China.
Russian-Korean relations revolved around the Six-Party Talks on North
Korea’s denuclearization (stalled after Pyongyang announced its intention
to restart its program, in violation of the 2007 agreement), as well as business deals on energy, automobiles, and aerospace. President Lee Myungbak visited Moscow for a summit with Medvedev and Putin in September
2008, where the two sides announced that their relationship had been upgraded to a strategic partnership. Lee pointedly refrained from criticizing
10. Andrew Iacobucci, “Kazakhstan: Astana Promotes Plan for Expanded Ties with Europe,” Eurasianet.org (October 23, 2008), <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/
articles/eav102308.shtml>.
11. Bruce Gale, “Russia and Japan Paper over Their Differences,” Straits Times (Singapore), May 14, 2008.
12. Joseph Ferguson, “Russia Disappointed in Dushanbe,” Japan Times, September 15,
2008.
13. Japan Ministry of Defense White Paper, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/
2008/part1/Chap1.pdf>.
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Moscow over Georgia; indeed, in a clear rebuke to Washington’s confrontational warnings, the Korean side expressed its support for Russian membership in the World Trade Organization and for Russia’s plans to host the
2012 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the 2014 Olympics.
Lee and Medvedev also agreed to push North Korea to cooperate on completing the Trans-Korea Railroad link.
Under pressure from the U.S. and its G-8 colleagues, Russia countered by
convening the first independent ministerial meeting of the BRIC emergingmarket countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) in Ekaterinburg in July,
followed by a G-8 sideline meeting among the four heads of state, in Hokkaido. Russian leaders find the idea of a BRIC grouping appealing as a
counterweight to U.S. and NATO dominance and, perhaps more important, as a dynamic economic grouping shifting the balance of power away
from the West. The four nations have common interests in strengthening
multilateralism and combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and there
are clear complementarities among their economies. Although the July
meeting of foreign ministers seemed in accord on the question of containing separatism (in the context of Serbia and Kosovo), Russia’s military action in Georgia was bound to strain ties among the new partners.
Relations with India warmed as Moscow courted the Asian giant through
the BRIC forum and in bilateral talks. During Medvedev’s December visit
to New Delhi, the two sides discussed cooperation in nuclear power, space
exploration, and weapons sales. The Russian president received a warm
reception but cut short his visit upon learning of the death of Orthodox
Patriarch Alexei II. Russia has actively courted India diplomatically and
economically, hoping to contain gains in U.S.-Indian relations made in recent years by the Bush administration. India, in turn, continues its efforts
to expand trade and acquire upstream energy assets in Russia and Eurasia. In August, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) bid
against China’s Sinopec for control of Imperial Energy Corporation, offering $2.6 billion. Imperial Energy, an oil and gas exploration and production company founded in 2004 and based in England, holds modest
hydrocarbon reserves in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Few Russian initiatives were evident in Southeast Asia in 2008. Indonesia took delivery of three Su-30 jet fighters and three Mi-17 helicopters,
with an additional three Su-27s to follow in 2009, but cancelled talks for
the purchase of Russian submarines.
Toward the end of 2007, Russia committed $500,000 for the ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-Russia Dialogue Partnership
Fund for energy, trade, and Russian language promotion projects. Russian
firms Rusal and Gazprom concluded agreements with Vietnam in the
aluminum and oil sectors. Russia and the U.S. clashed over the proposed
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extradition of Viktor Bout, a former Russian military officer suspected of
illegal arms trading who was arrested in Bangkok in March 2008, putting
Thailand in a difficult position. The Asian Development Bank in September approved a $40 million loan to Georgia at the lowest possible rate, signaling Asian displeasure with Russia’s action in the Caucasus.14

Conclusion
Russia started the year flush with oil money, with a rapidly expanding
economy, and confident that its position as a great power was firming up
nicely. Stage-managed presidential elections produced a smooth transition
from Putin to Medvedev, with the ex-KGB officer staying on to ensure
that the gains of the past eight years would not be lost. Strong central
authority was further guaranteed by the political stranglehold of United
Russia, the pro-presidential party that dominated the Duma and controlled
the bulk of Russia’s governorships. Ties with the U.S. and much of Europe
were strained, but relations with Asia showed great promise.
By the end of the year, the situation looked considerably bleaker. The
precipitous decline in oil and gas prices, and Putin’s intemperate criticism
of Russian business, coupled with the occupation of Georgia, contributed
to the collapse of the Russian stock markets, proving that Russia could
not shield itself from upheavals in the global economy. Asian criticism of
Russia’s military action in the Caucasus may have been muted, but there
were clearly fears in many quarters that Soviet-style aggression was back
in fashion. Russia’s authoritarian trends may not have preoccupied Asians
to the same extent as Europeans, but neither did they provide a workable
basis for an axis of authoritarian states led by Russia and China.

14. Keith Bradsher, “Asians Rebuke Russia with Loan for Georgia,” International Herald
Tribune, September 13, 2008.

